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How to Efficiently Process Uncertainty within
a Cyberinfrastructure without Sacrificing
Privacy and Confidentiality
Luc Longpré and Vladik Kreinovich
Department of Computer Science, University of Texas at El Paso, 500 W.
University, El Paso, TX 79968, USA, longpre@utep.edu, vladik@utep.edu

In this Chapter, we propose a simple solution to the problem of estimating uncertainty of the results of applying a black-box algorithm – without sacrificing
privacy and confidentiality of the algorithm.

1 Cyberinfrastructure and Web Services
1.1 Practical Problem: Need to Combine Geographically Separate
Computational Resources
In different knowledge domains in science and engineering, there is a large
amount of data stored in different locations, and there are many software
tools for processing this data, also implemented at different locations. Users
may be interested in different information about this domain.
Sometimes, the information required by the user is already stored in one
of the databases. For example, if we want to know the geological structure of
a certain region in Texas, we can get his information from the geological map
stored in Austin. In this case, all we need to do to get an appropriate response
to the query is to get this data from the corresponding database.
In other cases, different pieces of the information requested by the user are
stored at different locations. For example, if we are interested in the geological
structure of the Rio Grande Region, then we need to combine data from the
geological maps of Texas, New Mexico, and the Mexican state of Chihuahua.
In such situations, a correct response to the user’s query requires that we
access these pieces of information from different databases located at different
geographic notations.
In many other situations, the appropriate answer to the user’s request
requires that we not only collect the relevant data x1 , . . . , xn , but that we
also use some data processing algorithms f (x1 , . . . , xn ) to process this data.
For example, if we are interested in the large-scale geological structure of a
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geographical region, we may also use the gravity measurements from the gravity databases. For that, we need special algorithms to transform the values
of gravity at different locations into a map that describes how the density
changes with location. The corresponding data processing programs often require a lot of computational resources; as a result, many such programs reside
on computers located at supercomputer centers, i.e., on computers which are
physically separated from the places where the data is stored.
The need to combine computational resources (data and programs) located
at different geographic locations seriously complicates research.
1.2 Centralization of Computational Resources – Traditional
Approach to Combining Computational Resources; Its Advantages
and Limitations
Traditionally, a widely used way to make these computational resources more
accessible was to move all these resources to a central location. For example,
in the geosciences, the US Geological Survey (USGS) was trying to become a
central depository of all relevant geophysical data. However, this centralization
requires a large amount of efforts: data are presented in different formats,
the existing programs use specific formats, etc. To make the central data
depository efficient, it is necessary:
• to reformat all the data,
• to rewrite all the data processing programs – so that they become fully
compatible with the selected formats and with each other,
• etc.
The amount of work that is needed for this reformatting and rewriting is so
large that none of these central depositories really succeeded in becoming an
easy-to-use centralized database.
1.3 Cyberinfrastructure – A More Efficient Approach to
Combining Computational Resources
Cyberinfrastructure technique is a new approach that provides the users with
the efficient way to submit requests without worrying about the geographic
locations of different computational resources – and at the same time avoid
centralization with its excessive workloads. The main idea behind this approach is that we keep all (or at least most) the computational resources
• at their current locations,
• in their current formats.
To expedite the use of these resources:
•

we supplement the local computational resources with the “metadata”,
i.e., with the information about the formats, algorithms, etc.,
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• we “wrap up” the programs and databases with auxiliary programs that
provide data compatibility into web services,
and, in general, we provide a cyberinfrastructure that uses the metadata to
automatically combine different computational resources.
For example, if a user is interested in using the gravity data to uncover
the geological structure of the Rio Grande region, then the system should
automatically:
•
•
•
•

get the gravity data from the UTEP and USGS gravity databases,
convert them to a single format (if necessary),
forward this data to the program located at San Diego Supercomputer
Center, and
move the results back to the user.

This example is exactly what we are designing under the NSF-sponsored Cyberinfrastructure for the Geosciences (GEON) project; see, e.g., [1, 2, 3, 8, 9,
27, 37, 45, 47, 48, 58, 62, 63]. This is similar to what other cyberinfrastructure
projects are trying to achieve.
1.4 What Is Cyberinfrastructure: The Official NSF Definition
According to the final report of the National Science Foundation (NSF) Blue
Ribbon Advisory Panel on Cyberinfrastructure, “a new age has dawned in
scientific and engineering research, pushed by continuing progress in computing, information, and communication technology, and pulled by the expanding complexity, scope, and scale of today’s challenges. The capacity of this
technology has crossed thresholds that now make possible a comprehensive
‘cyberinfrastructure’ on which to build new types of scientific and engineering knowledge environments and organizations and to pursue research in new
ways and with increased efficacy.
Such environments and organizations, enabled by cyberinfrastructure, are
increasingly required to address national and global priorities, such as understanding global climate change, protecting our natural environment, applying
genomics-proteomics to human health, maintaining national security, mastering the world of nanotechnology, and predicting and protecting against natural
and human disasters, as well as to address some of our most fundamental intellectual questions such as the formation of the universe and the fundamental
character of matter.”
1.5 Web Services: What They Do – A Brief Summary
In different knowledge domains, there is a large amount of data stored in
different locations; algorithms for processing this data are also implemented
at different locations. Web services – and, more generally, cyberinfrastructure
– provide the users with an efficient way to submit requests without worrying

4
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about the geographic locations of different computational resources (databases
and programs) – and avoid centralization with its excessive workloads [21].
Web services enable the user to receive the desired data x1 , . . . , xn and the
results y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) of processing this data.

2 Processing Uncertainty Within a Cyberinfrastructure
2.1 Formulation of the problem
The data xi usually come from measurements or from experts. Measurements
are never 100% accurate; as a result, the measured values x
ei are, in general,
somewhat different from the actual (unknown) values xi of the corresponding
quantities. Experts can also only provide us with approximate values of the
desired quantities.
As a result of this measurement or expert uncertainty, the result ye =
f (e
x1 , . . . , x
en ) of data processing is, in general, different from the actual value
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) of the desired quantity. It is desirable to gauge this difference. To do that, we must have some information about the errors of direct
measurements.
Bounds on the measurement errors. What do we know about the errors
def
∆xi = x
ei −xi of direct measurements? First, the manufacturer of the measuring instrument must supply us with an upper bound ∆i on the measurement
error. If no such upper bound is supplied, this means that no accuracy is guaranteed, and the corresponding “measuring instrument” is practically useless.
In this case, once we performed a measurement and got a measurement result
x
ei , we know that the actual (unknown) value xi of the measured quantity
belongs to the interval xi = [xi , xi ], where xi = x
ei − ∆i and xi = x
ei + ∆i .
Case of probabilistic uncertainty. In many practical situations, we not only
know the interval [−∆i , ∆i ] of possible values of the measurement error; we
also know the probability of different values ∆xi within this interval. This
knowledge underlies the traditional engineering approach to estimating the
error of indirect measurement, in which we assume that we know the probability distributions for measurement errors ∆xi .
These probabilities are often described by a normal distribution, so in
standard engineering textbook on measurement, it is usually assumed that the
distribution of ∆xi is normal, with 0 average and known standard deviation
σi ; see, e.g. [20, 46].
In general, we can determine the desired probabilities of different values
of ∆xi by comparing the results of measuring with this instrument with the
results of measuring the same quantity by a standard (much more accurate)
measuring instrument. Since the standard measuring instrument is much more
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accurate than the one use, the difference between these two measurement results is practically equal to the measurement error; thus, the empirical distribution of this difference is close to the desired probability distribution for
measurement error.
Case of interval uncertainty. There are two cases, however, when in practice,
we do not determine the probabilities:
•

•

First is the case of cutting-edge measurements, e.g., measurements in fundamental science. When a Hubble telescope detects the light from a distant
galaxy, there is no “standard” (much more accurate) telescope floating
nearby that we can use to calibrate the Hubble: the Hubble telescope is
the best we have.
The second case is the case of measurements on the shop floor. In this
case, in principle, every sensor can be thoroughly calibrated, but sensor
calibration is so costly – usually costing ten times more than the sensor
itself – that manufacturers rarely do it.

In both cases, we have no information about the probabilities of ∆xi ; the only
information we have is the upper bound on the measurement error.
In this case, after we performed a measurement and got a measurement
result x
ei , the only information that we have about the actual value xi of the
measured quantity is that it belongs to the interval xi = [e
xi − ∆i , x
ei + ∆i ].
In such situations, the only information that we have about the (unknown)
actual value of y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) is that y belongs to the range y = [y, y] of
the function f over the box x1 × . . . × xn :
y = [y, y] = {f (x1 , . . . , xn ) | x1 ∈ x1 , . . . , xn ∈ xn }.
The process of computing this interval range based on the input intervals xi
is called interval computations; see, e.g., [24, 26].
Case of fuzzy uncertainty. Often, knowledge comes in terms of uncertain expert estimates. In the fuzzy case, to describe this uncertainty, for each value
of estimation error ∆xi , we describe the degree µi (∆xi ) to which this value
is possible.
For each degree of certainty α, we can determine the set of values of ∆xi
that are possible with at least this degree of certainty – the α-cut {x | µ(x) ≥
α} of the original fuzzy set. In most cases, this α-cut is an interval.
Vice versa, if we know α-cuts for every α, then, for each object x, we can
determine the degree of possibility that x belongs to the original fuzzy set
[7, 30, 38, 40, 41]. A fuzzy set can be thus viewed as a nested family of its
α-cuts.
So, if instead of a (crisp) interval xi of possible values of the measured
quantity, we have a fuzzy set µi (x) of possible values, then we can view this
information as a family of nested intervals xi (α) – α-cuts of the given fuzzy
sets.
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2.2 Description of uncertainty: general formulas
In this chapter, we will only consider a typical situation in which the direct
measurements and/or expert estimates are accurate enough, so that the resulting approximation errors ∆xi are small, and terms which are quadratic
(or of higher order) in ∆xi can be safely neglected. In such situations, the dependence of the desired value y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = f (e
x1 − ∆x1 , . . . , x
en − ∆xn )
on ∆xi can be safely assumed to be linear.
Comment. There are practical situations when the accuracy of the direct measurements is not high enough, and hence, quadratic terms cannot be safely
neglected (see, e.g., [26] and references therein). In this case, the problem
of error estimation for indirect measurements becomes computationally difficult (NP-hard) even when the function f (x1 , . . . , xn ) is quadratic [34, 60].
However, in most real-life situations, the possibility to ignore quadratic terms
is a reasonable assumption, because, e.g., for an error of 1% its square is a
negligible 0.01%.
When approximation errors are small, we can simplify the expression for
∆y = ye − y = f (e
x1 , . . . , x
en ) − f (x1 , . . . , xn ) if we expand the function f in
Taylor series around the point (e
x1 , . . . , x
en ) and restrict ourselves only to linear
terms in this expansion. As a result, we get the expression
∆y = c1 · ∆x1 + . . . + cn · ∆xn ,

(1)

where by ci , we denoted the value of the partial derivative ∂f /∂xi at the point
(e
x1 , . . . , x
en ):
∂f
ci =
.
(2)
∂xi |(e
x1 ,...,e
xn )
Case of probabilistic uncertainty. In the statistical setting, the desired measurement error ∆y is a linear combination of independent Gaussian variables
∆xi . Therefore, ∆y is also normally distributed, with 0 average and the standard deviation
q
σ = c21 · σ12 + . . . + c2n · σn2 .
(3)
Comment. A similar formula holds if we do not assume that ∆xi are normally
distributed: it is sufficient to assume that they are independent variables with
0 average and known standard deviations σi .
Case of interval uncertainty. In the interval setting, we do not know the
probability of different errors ∆xi ; instead, we only know that |∆xi | ≤ ∆i . In
this case, the sum (1) attains its largest possible value if each term ci · ∆xi in
this sum attains the largest possible value:
• If ci ≥ 0, then this term is a monotonically non-decreasing function of
∆xi , so it attains its largest value at the largest possible value ∆xi = ∆i ;
the corresponding largest value of this term is ci · ∆i .
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• If ci < 0, then this term is a decreasing function of ∆xi , so it attains its
largest value at the smallest possible value ∆xi = −∆i ; the corresponding
largest value of this term is −ci · ∆i = |ci | · ∆i .
In both cases, the largest possible value of this term is |ci | · ∆i , so, the largest
possible value of the sum ∆y is
∆ = |c1 | · ∆1 + . . . + |cn | · ∆n .

(4)

Similarly, the smallest possible value of ∆y is −∆.
Hence, the interval of possible values of ∆y is [−∆, ∆], with ∆ defined by
the formula (4).
Case of fuzzy uncertainty. We have already mentioned that if instead of a
(crisp) interval xi of possible values of the measured quantity, we have a fuzzy
set µi (x) of possible values, then we can view this information as a family of
nested intervals xi (α) – α-cuts of the given fuzzy sets.
Our objective is then to compute the fuzzy number corresponding to this
the desired value y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ). In this case, for each level α, to compute
the α-cut of this fuzzy number, we can apply interval computations to the
α-cuts xi (α) of the corresponding fuzzy sets. The resulting nested intervals
form the desired fuzzy set for y.
So, e.g., if we want to describe 10 different levels of uncertainty, then we
must solve 10 interval computation problems – i.e., apply the formula (4) 10
times.
In many practical situations, there is no need to perform 10 computations. For example, it is often reasonable to assume that all the membership
functions µi (xi ) have the same shape and only differ by a scaling parameter,
i.e., all have the form µi (∆xi ) = µ0 (∆xi /∆i ) for some fixed function µ0 (x)
(e.g., triangular or Gaussian). In this case, as it is well known [14, 15, 16, 25],
the membership function for ∆y has a similar form µ0 (∆y/∆), where ∆ is
determined by the formula (4).
Comment. These formulas correspond to the case when in the extension principle that describe how the uncertainty in ∆xi transforms into the uncertainty
in ∆y, we interpret “and” as min, i.e., if we consider
µ(∆y) =

max

∆x1 ,...,∆xn

min(µ1 (∆x1 ), . . . , µn (∆xn )),

(5)

where maximum is taken over all the values ∆x1 , . . . , ∆xn for which the expression (1) for ∆y leads to the given value of ∆y. In general, we can use a
different t-norm to combine the values µi (∆xi ). For example, we may use the
product and describe the resulting membership function as
µ(∆y) =

max

∆x1 ,...,∆xn

µ1 (∆x1 ) · . . . · µn (∆xn ).

(6)

In this case, if we assume that all the membership functions µi (∆xi ) are
Gaussian, i.e., have the form µi (∆xi ) = µ0 (∆xi /σi ), where µ0 (z) = exp(−z 2 ),
then the resulting membership function for ∆y is also Gaussian µ(∆y) =
µ0 (∆y/σ), where σ is determined by the formula (3); see, e.g., [14, 15, 16, 25].
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2.3 Error Estimation for the Results of Data Processing: A
Precise Computational Formulation of the Problem
As a result of the above analysis, we get the following explicit formulation
of the problem: given a function f (x1 , . . . , xn ), n numbers x
e1 , . . . , x
en , and
n positive numbers σ1 , . . . , σn (or ∆1 , . . . , ∆n ), compute the corresponding
expression (3) or (4).
Let us describe how this problem is solved now.
2.4 How This Problem Is Solved Now
Textbook case: the function f is given by its analytical expression. If the function f is given by its analytical expression, then we can simply explicitly
differentiate it, and get an explicit expression for (3) and (4). This is the case
which is typically analyzed in textbooks on measurement theory; see, e.g.,
[20, 46].
A more complex case: automatic differentiation. In many practical cases, we
do not have an explicit analytical expression, we only have an algorithm for
computing the function f (x1 , . . . , xn ), an algorithm which is too complicated
to be expressed as an analytical expression.
When this algorithm is presented in one of the standard programming
languages such as Fortran or C, we can let the compute perform an explicit
differentiation; for that, we can use one of the existing automatic differentiation tools (see, e.g., [6, 22]). These tools analyze the code of the program for
computing f (x1 , . . . , xn ) and, as they perform their analysis, they produce the
“differentiation code”, i.e., a program that computes the partial derivatives ci .
Once we know an algorithm that computes f in time T , automatic differentiation (AD) enables us to compute all partial derivatives in time ≤ 3T ,
hence we can compute σ or ∆ in time O(T + n).

3 Need for Privacy Makes the Problem More Complex
Privacy situation: description. In cyberinfrastructure, the owners of the program f may not want to disclose its code; instead, they may only allow to use
f as a black box.
Real world example. For example, to find places where oil can be found, it
is important to know the structure of the Earth crust at different locations.
One of the main techniques for determining this structure is the use of seismic
data: we use the measured travel-times of the natural (or artificial) seismic
signals as they go from their source to their on-surface destination, and then
we solve the corresponding inverse problem to find the Earth structure; see,
e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 23, 44, 64].
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Because of the importance of the seismic inverse problem, oil companies are
heavily investing in developing algorithms for solving such problems. This is a
very competitive area of research, so the algorithms are kept confidential. Since
most major algorithms have similar efficiency and accuracy, a company is
willing to allow other users – researchers or competitors from other companies
– to actually use their code. However, companies are very reluctant to let
the users have actual access to their code. The reason for this reluctance
is that different companies have achieved the similar level of efficiency and
accuracy by using different ideas and programming improvements. As a result,
a company that unilaterally discloses its code would thus let competitors use
its ideas (and thus, improve their code) without getting any benefits in return.
Thus, the companies are allowing to use their code, but only as a black
box.
What was known before. The problem of preserving the code’s privacy and
confidentiality is a particular case of a general problem of privacy preservation
in data processing; see, e.g., [10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 28, 29, 35, 39, 42, 43, 49, 50,
51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61]. At present, privacy-preserving algorithms are
mainly concerned with privacy of data; privacy of code is a problem for which
few results are known.
Related difficulty. If we do not know the code of f , then we cannot apply AD
∂f
to compute all n partial derivatives ci =
.
∂xi
A straightforward method of solving this problem: numerical differentiation.
The most straightforward algorithm for solving this problem is to compute the
derivatives ci one-by-one, and then use the corresponding formula (3) or (4)
to compute the desired σ. To compute the i-th partial derivative, we change
the i-th input xi to x
ei + hi for some hi , and leave other inputs unchanged,
i.e., we take δi = hi for this i and δj = 0 for all j 6= i. Then, we estimate ci as
ci =

f (e
x1 , . . . , x
ei−1 , x
ei + hi , x
ei+1 , . . . , x
en ) − ye
.
hi

(7)

This algorithm is called numerical differentiation.
We want the change hi to be small (so that quadratic terms can be neglected); we already know that changes of the order σi are small. So, it is
natural to take hi = σi (or, correspondingly, hi = ∆i ). In other words, to
compute ci , we use the following values: δ1 = . . . = δi−1 = 0, δi = σi (or
δi = ∆i ), δi+1 = . . . = δn = 0.
Problem: sometimes, numerical differentiation takes too long. Very often, the
program f requires a reasonable time to compute (e.g., in the geological applications, computing f may involve solving an inverse problem). In this case,
applying the function f is the most time-consuming part of this algorithm.
So, the total time that it takes us to compute σ or ∆ is (approximately) equal
to the running time T for the program f multiplied by the number of times
Nf that we call the program f .
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For numerical differentiation, Nf = n (we call f n times to compute n
partial derivatives). Hence, if the program f takes a long time to compute,
and n is huge, then the resulting time T · n (which is À T + n) may be
too long. For example, if we are determining some parameters of an oil well
from the geophysical measurements, we may get n in the thousands, and T
in minutes. In this case, T · n may take several weeks. This may be OK for a
single measurement, but too long if we want more on-line results.

4 Solution for Statistical Setting: Monte-Carlo
Simulations
Monte-Carlo simulations: main idea. In the statistical setting, we can use
straightforward (Monte-Carlo) simulation, and drastically save the computation time. In this approach, we use a computer-based random number generator to simulate the normally distributed error. A standard normal random
number generator usually produces a normal distribution with 0 average and
standard deviation 1. So, to simulate a distribution with a standard deviation
σi , we multiply the result αi of the standard random number generator by σi .
In other words, we take δi = σi · αi .
As a result of N Monte-Carlo simulations, we get N values c(1) =
c · δ (1) , . . . , c(N ) = c · δ (N ) which are normally distributed with the desired
standard deviation σ. So, we can determine σ by using the standard statistical
estimate
v
u
N
u 1
X
¡
¢2
σ=t
·
c(k) .
(8)
N −1
k=1

Computation time required for Monte-Carlo simulation. √
The relative error of
the above statistical estimate depends only on N (as ≈ 1/ N ), and not on the
number of variables n. Therefore, the number Nf of calls to f that is needed
to achieve a given accuracy does not depend on the number of variables at
all.
The error of the above algorithm
√ is asymptotically normally distributed,
with a standard deviation σe ∼ σ/ 2N . Thus, if we use a “two sigma” bound,
we conclude that with probability 95%, this algorithm leads √
to an estimate
for σ which differs from the actual value of σ by ≤ 2σe = 2σ/ 2N .
This is an error with which we estimate the error of indirect measurement;
we do not need too much accuracy in this estimation, because, e.g., in real life,
we say that an error is ±10% or ±20%, but not that the error is, say, ±11.8%.
Therefore, in estimating the error of indirect measurements, it is sufficient to
estimate the characteristics of this error with a relative accuracy of, say, 20%.
For the above “two sigma” estimate,
this means that we need to select the
√
smallest N for which 2σe = 2σ/ 2N ≤ 0.2 · σ, i.e., to select Nf = N = 50.
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In many practical situations, it is sufficient to have a standard deviation
of 20% (i.e., to have a “two sigma” guarantee of 40%). In this case, we need
only N = 13 calls to f .
On the other hand, if we want to guarantee 20% accuracy in 99.9%
cases,√which correspond to “three sigma”, we must use N for which 3σe =
3 · σ/ 2N ≤ 0.2 · σ, i.e., we must select Nf = N = 113, etc.
For n ≈ 103 , all these values of Nf are much smaller than Nf = n required
for numerical differentiation.
So, if we have to choose between the (deterministic) numerical differentiation and the randomized Monte-Carlo algorithm, we must select:
•

a deterministic algorithm when the number of variables n satisfies the
inequality n ≤ N0 (where N0 ≈ 50), and
• a randomized method if n ≥ N0 .

Additional advantage: parallelization. In Monte-Carlo algorithm, we need 50
calls to f . If each call requires a minute, the resulting time takes about an
hour, which may be too long for on-line results. Fortunately, different calls to
the function f are independent on each other, so we can run all the simulations
in parallel.
The more processors we have, the less time the resulting computation will
take. If we have as many processors as the required number of calls, then the
time needed to estimate the error of indirect measurement becomes equal to
the time of a single call, i.e., to the time necessary to compute the result ye
of this indirect measurement. Thus, if we have enough processors working in
parallel, we can compute the result of the indirect measurement and estimate
its error during the same time that it normally takes just to compute the
result.
In particular, if the result ye of indirect measurement can be computed in
real time, we can estimate the error of this result in real time as well.

5 Solution for Interval and Fuzzy Setting: New Method
Based on Cauchy Distribution
Can we use a similar idea in the interval setting? Since Monte-Carlo simulation speeds up computations, it is desirable to use a similar technique in
interval setting as well.
There is a problem here. In the interval setting, we do not know the exact
distribution, we may have different probability distributions – as long as they
are located within the corresponding intervals. If we only use one of these
distributions for simulations, there is no guarantee that the results will be
valid for other distributions as well.
In principle, we could repeat simulations for several different distributions,
but this repetition would drastically increase the simulation time and thus,
eliminate the advantages of simulation as opposed to numerical differentiation.
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Yes, we can. Luckily, there is a mathematical trick that enables us to use
Monte-Carlo simulation in interval setting as well. This trick is based on
using Cauchy distribution – i.e., probability distributions with the probability
density
∆
ρ(z) =
;
(9)
2
π · (z + ∆2 )
the value ∆ is called the scale parameter of this distribution, or simply a
parameter, for short.
Cauchy distribution has the following property that we will use: if z1 , . . . , zn
are independent random variables, and each of zi is distributed according to the Cauchy law with parameter ∆i , then their linear combination
z = c1 · z1 + . . . + cn · zn is also distributed according to a Cauchy law,
with a scale parameter ∆ = |c1 | · ∆1 + . . . + |cn | · ∆n .
Therefore, if we take random variables δi which are Cauchy distributed
with parameters ∆i , then the value
c = f (e
x1 + δ1 , . . . , x
en + δn ) − f (e
x1 , . . . , x
en ) = c1 · δ1 + . . . + cn · δn

(10)

is Cauchy distributed with the desired parameter (4). So, repeating this experiment N times, we get N values c(1) , . . . , c(N ) which are Cauchy distributed
with the unknown parameter, and from them we can estimate ∆.
The bigger N , the better estimates we get.
There are two questions to be solved:
•
•

how to simulate the Cauchy distribution;
how to estimate the parameter ∆ of this distribution from a finite sample.

Simulation can be based on the functional transformation of uniformly distributed sample values:
δi = ∆i · tan(π · (ri − 0.5)),

(11)

where ri is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
In order to estimate σ, we can apply the Maximum Likelihood Method
ρ(d1 ) · ρ(d2 ) · . . . · ρ(dn ) → max, where ρ(z) is a Cauchy distribution density
with the unknown ∆. When we substitute the above-given formula for ρ(z)
and equate the derivative of the product with respect to ∆ to 0 (since it is a
maximum), we get an equation
1
1
N
µ
µ
¶2 + . . . +
¶2 = .
2
(1)
(N )
1 + c∆
1 + c∆

(12)

The left-hand side of (12) is an increasing
that is equal to 0(< N/2)
¯ function
¯
for ∆ = 0 and > N/2 for ∆ = max ¯c(k) ¯; therefore the solution to the
equation
¯ (12)
¯¤ can be found by applying a bisection method to the interval
£
0, max ¯c(k) ¯ .
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It is important to mention that we assumed that the function f is reasonably linear within the box
[e
x 1 − ∆1 , x
e1 + ∆1 ] × . . . × [e
x n − ∆n , x
en + ∆n ].

(13)

However, the simulated values δi may be outside the box. When we get such
values, we do not use the function f for them, we use a normalized function
that is equal to f within the box, and that is extended linearly for all other
values (we will see, in the description of an algorithm, how this is done).
As a result, we arrive at the following algorithm (described, for a somewhat
different problem, in [32, 33, 36, 59]):
Algorithm.
•
•

Apply f to the results of direct measurements: ye := f (e
x1 , . . . , x
en );
For k = 1, 2, . . . , N , repeat the following:
• use the standard random number generator to compute n numbers
(k)
ri , i = 1, 2, . . . , n, that are uniformly distributed on the interval
[0, 1];
(k)
(k)
• compute Cauchy distributed values ci := tan(π · (ri − 0.5));
(k)
• compute the largest value of |ci | so that we will be able to normalize
the simulated measurement errors and apply f to the values that are
(k)
within the box of possible values: K := maxi |ci |;
(k)
(k)
• compute the simulated measurement errors δi := ∆i · ci /K;
(k)
(k)
ei + δi ;
• compute the simulated measurement results xi := x
• apply the program f to the simulated measurement results and compute the simulated error of the indirect measurement:
´
´
³ ³
(k)
− ye ;
c(k) := K · f x1 , . . . , x(k)
n

• Compute ∆ by applying the bisection method to solve the equation (12).
When is this randomized algorithm better than deterministic numerical differentiation? To determine the parameter ∆, we use the maximum likelihood
method. It is known that the error of this method is asymptotically
nor√
mally distributed, with 0 average and standard deviation 1/ N · I, where I
is Fisher’s information:
µ
¶2
Z ∞
1
∂ρ
I=
·
dz.
∂∆
−∞ ρ
For Cauchy probability density ρ(z), we have I = 1/(2∆2 ), so the error of
the above randomized algorithm
pis asymptotically normally distributed, with
a standard deviation σe ∼ ∆ · 2/N . Thus, if we use a “two sigma” bound,
we conclude that with probability 95%, this algorithm leads topan estimate
for ∆ which differs from the actual value of ∆ by ≤ 2σe = 2∆ · 2/N . So, if
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we want to achieve a 20% accuracy
p in the error estimation, we must use the
smallest N for which 2σe = 2∆ · 2/N ≤ 0.2 · ∆, i.e., to select Nf = N = 200.
When it is sufficient to have a standard deviation of 20% (i.e., to have a
“two sigma” guarantee of 40%), we need only N = 50 calls to f . For n ≈
103 , both values Nf are much smaller than Nf = n required for numerical
differentiation.
So, if we have to choose between the (deterministic) numerical differentiation and the randomized Monte-Carlo algorithm, we must select:
•

a deterministic algorithm when the number of variables n satisfies the
inequality n ≤ N0 (where N0 ≈ 200), and
• a randomized algorithm if n ≥ N0 .

Comment. If we use fewer than N0 simulations, then we still get an approximate value of the range, but with worse accuracy – and the accuracy can be
easily computed by using the above formulas.
This algorithm is naturally parallelizable. Similarly to the Monte-Carlo algorithm for statistical setting, we can run all N simulations in parallel and thus,
speed up the computations.
Conclusion. When we know the code for f , then we can use AD and compute
∆ and σ in time O(T + n). If the owner of the program f only allows to
use it as a black box, then we cannot use AD any more. In principle, we can
compute each of n derivatives ∂f /∂xi by numerical differentiation, but this
would require computation time T · n À T + n.
For probabilistic uncertainty, one can use Monte-Carlo simulations and
compute σ in time O(T ) ¿ T · n. We have shown that for interval uncertainty,
we can also compute ∆ in time O(T ) by using an artificial Monte-Carlo simulations in which each ∆xi is Cauchy distributed with parameter ∆i – then
simulated ∆y is Cauchy distributed with the desired parameter ∆.
Remark: the problem of non-linearity. In the above text, we assumed that the
intervals xi are narrow. In this case, terms quadratic in ∆xi are negligible,
and so, we can safely assume that the desired function f (x1 , . . . , xn ) is linear
on the box
x1 × . . . × xn .
In practice, some intervals xi may be wide, so even when restricted to the
box, the function f (x1 , . . . , xn ) is non-linear. What can we do in this case?
Usually, experts (e.g., designers of the corresponding technical system)
know for which variables xi , the dependence is non-linear. For each of these
variables, we can bisect the corresponding interval [xi , xi ] into two smaller
subintervals – for which the dependence is approximately linear. Then, we
estimate the range of the function f separately on each of the resulting subboxes, and take the union of these two ranges as the range over the entire
box.
If one bisection is not enough and the dependence of f on xi is non-linear
over one or several subboxes, we can bisect these boxes again, etc.
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This bisection idea has been successfully used in interval computations;
see, e.g., [24, 26].

6 Summary
In different knowledge domains, there is a large amount of data stored in
different locations; algorithms for processing this data are also implemented
at different locations. Web services – and, more generally, cyberinfrastructure
– provide the users with an efficient way to submit requests without worrying
about the geographic locations of different computational resources (databases
and programs) – and avoid centralization with its excessive workloads [21].
Web services enable the user to receive the desired data x1 , . . . , xn and the
results y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) of processing this data.
The data xi usually come from measurements or from experts. Measurements are never 100% accurate; as a result, the measured values x
ei are, in
general, somewhat different from the actual (unknown) values xi of the corresponding quantities. Experts can also only provide us with approximate values
of the desired quantities.
As a result of this measurement or expert uncertainty, the result ye =
f (e
x1 , . . . , x
en ) of data processing is, in general, different from the actual value
y = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) of the desired quantity. It is desirable to gauge this difference.
Traditional methods for estimating the resulting uncertainty in y are based
on the assumption that we know the code of the function f . In cyberinfrastructure, owners of the program f may not want to disclose its code; instead,
they may only allow to use f as a black box. In this case, traditional techniques
are not applicable.
There exist techniques for processing uncertainty under such a “black-box”
situation, but these techniques require much longer computation time. In this
chapter, we describe new Monte-Carlo-type techniques that process uncertainty in such privacy-protecting black-box situations and that require the
same amount of computation time as the traditional non-privacy-protecting
techniques.
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